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This capstone project addresses the prospect of reform within the Democratic

People's Republic of Korea, North Korea. DPRK: and what, if any role the People's
Republic of China. China, will play in North Korea and its prospects for reform. This
report addresses three main questions: 1) Is the DPRK's economy in enough trouble to
encourage them to make concessions?: 2) How much leverage does China really have

over the DPRK, economically or politically?; 3) Why (and will?) the Kims stay in
nominal charge?. The answers to these questions are further explained within the body of

this paper.
1. Is the DPRK's economy in enough trouble to encourage them to

concessions?
a) What is the likelihood North
This question is further separatedinto
intotwo
twoparts:
p

Korea will make concessions for economic assistance? and b) What is the likelihood that
North Korea will make any efforts at fundamentally reforming their economy.. First. I

judge with moderate confidence that North Korea will not offer any major concessions in
return for food or other economic assistance from the world. Yes. from an Am

perspective, the North Korean economy is failing and going backwards, but
Korean economy has improved from its lowest point. Moreover, the North

government has maintained a high level of control over the people. In the N

view, they are able to maintain their political power, their economy is not go
far from its lowest point and their recent rhetoric against the United States and the

has helped Kim Jong-Un consolidate his power within the government and in the eyes of

his people. Additionally, the US, one of the lead negotiators and providers of
humanitarian aid with North Korea, has stated multiple times that it will not negotiate
with North Korea unless it shows that it is working toward complete, verifiable, and

irreversible dismantlement (CVID). However, the United States has repeatedly presented
this demand but has backed down and eventually did offer humanitarian aid to North
Korea without proof of CVID. The North Korean government is not ignorant of history.
As explained later in the paper, if a country threatens the world enough or has enough

economic trouble, another country in the world eventually helps. With this attitude going

into negotiations, North Korea is unlikely to offer any major concessions.
Secondly. I judge with moderate confidence that North Korea is unlikely to work

toward any fundamental reform of their economic system within the next two to three

years. To improve its economy, the DPRK government needs to not only to change from

extractive economic institutions to an inclusive economic institutions, but also to an

inclusive political institutions, as well, since economic institutions stem from political

institutions. As seen from the Soviet Union, extractive policies are not sustainable in the
long run. 1 judge that the current North Korean is unwilling to change their economic
system because they do not want to risk upsetting the balance of power within the
country.

How much leverage does China have over North Korea economically or politically?
China has little leverage over North Korea economically or

politically. China plays an important role in helping North Korea maintain its

legitimacy as a state, but China has little power to sway North Korea toward

make any major changes to its economic or political structure. As North Korea's

only major ally. China has boxed itself in regarding options. China cannot drop

all protection from Pyongyang without threatening the stability of their regime.
North Korea's ability to support itself in the world without the support of China is

unknown. One of China's main goals regarding the Korean peninsula is to
maintain North Korea as a buffer state between China and NATO forces in the
south. Through this. China prefers a not-quite failing, military first North Korea
to a unified Korea or no North Korea at all. Most importantly, North Korea

knows this.
While China cannot threaten North Korea into behaving in what is consider a

more normal fashion with the world, China does have a moderate amount of
leverage regarding the North Korean economy. While China's investments in

North Korea mean that China cannot threaten abandonment, it also means that
China can, on a smaller scale, ensure activity within North Korea's economy and

spur some investment. China alone cannot solve all of North Korea's economic
problems, nor can it alter North Korea's behavior via economic means, but China

can help ensure that North Korea stays afloat which is also important.
Why (and will?) the Kims stay in charge, at least nominally?

With this question, it is important to specify nominally instead of the

actual power running the country. Given the opacity of the North Korean regime and the
difficulties associated with obtaining clear data, it is nearly impossible to know the actual
power structure within the country through open source intelligence. North Korea has

built a personality cult surrounding Kim Il-Sung, Kim Jong-Il. and Kim Jong-Un. If the
3

Kim family loses control over the country, any incoming leaders will have to overturn the
current system that is entrenched throughout the country. Whether Kim Jong-Un makes

the decisions behind the curtain is not important in the matter. What matters is that Kim

Jong-Un is seen as the product of their Eternal President and a rallying point. The Kim

family also provides a rallying point toward the rest of the world as well. When
considering the North Korean regime, most people do not consider North Korean

citizens, but instead focus on the current Kim ruler as representative of all problems

within the country.
The only plausible scenario where the Kim family would publicly lose leadership

would be a military coup, most likely the in order to avoid what they consider an
undesirable direction for the military such as legitimate threats to fire nuclear weapons.

The paper itself is separated into three sections which explain the above questions
and answers in much fuller detail. Section One describes the current economic situation
within the DPRK, and explains how they arrived at this point as well as the politics

behind the economics. The DPRK's economy is define by its extractive policies which

are a product of its extractive political institutions. Extractive political and economic
institutions have existed since the founding of the DPRK and have caused most of the
DPRK s current economic misfortunes. Extractive institutions and policies are ones
which lack secure property rights, have a bias law system, and there is not a level playing

field for people to exchange and contract, or public markets.1 The main North Korea's
main ideology, known as 'juche’ or self-reliance, is one of the most prominent examples

1
Daron Acemoglu, and James Robinson. Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power. Prosperity, and
Poverty. (Crown Business. 2012). 74-75
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of how extractive ideas dominate and harm the country. North Korea's economy is based
primarily on agriculture and the nation consists of pitiable farmland; to promote continual

self-reliance is not sensible from an economic perspective.

Section Two discusses the relationship between the DPRK and the PRC. including
their political, military and economic ties. Within the political section, it is important to
consider the differing opinions between the countries regarding their alliance. The DPRK

and PRC s military relationship began with the Korean War when the newly founded PRC
crossed the Yalu and helped the North fight back and push US and Allied troops below

the 38 parallel. Following the Korean War, the PLA helped rebuild North Korea, but has
had little overt involvement in the country since. China is currently obligated to defend
North Korea militarily as required by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual

Assistance. As for economic ties, trade between China and North Korea has exploded
since China s economic revival in the late 1970s. The actual trade amounts and items
traded were affected by the political mood at the time. Following such instances as the

PRC's official recognition of South Korea as a country, trade between the PRC and the

DPRK suffered, but otherwise, trade has followed an upward trend for the past few
decades.

Despite the political, military and economic relationship China and North Korea
share, North Korea s WMD program is a major source of contention between the two

countries. China has repeatedly stated that it opposes North Korea possessing nuclear
weapons. Despite this. North Korea has continued to build its nuclear arsenal and

recently conducted their third nuclear test on February 12. 2013.

Section Three discusses three different scenarios regarding the possibility of
5

reform in North Korea within the next two to three years. I judge with moderate

confidence that North Korea will work to remain at a status quo situation and that their
economic situation will not significantly improve or deteriorate.

6

Chapter 1: The Economics of the DPRK
Current State of the DPRK's Economy
North Korea's economy suffers from two major problems: deteriorated capital

stock and misallocated spending. A large quantity of the DPRK's capital stock is "nearly

beyond repair as a result of years of underinvestment, shortages of spare parts, and poor

maintenance."2 This is due in part to the second major obstacle: the government
concentrates on "large-scale military spending [which] draws off resources needed for
investment and civilian consumption”.2
3 As a result of these factors, the DPRK is

currently facing major problems.

The DPRK military spending as a percentage of G DP far outpaces the rest of the

world. Exact statistics regarding the DPRK's GDP and military spending are unavailable.
Not all countries around the globe have readily verifiable figures. Excluding North

Korea, the expenditures for other countries listed are a percentage of GDP on an
exchange rate basis and not a purchasing power parity basis. As a result, the exact

numerical differences between North Korea and other countries is inaccurate.
Disregarding the margin of error within the statistics, they still tell a compelling story.

According to the CIA World Factbook, the country with the greatest military expenditures
as a percentage of GDP are Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia which all range between 10-

2
“Korea. North.’- CIA—World Factbook. Updated April 1. 2013.
https://wwv.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html
3
CIA World Factbook. 2013
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11%4 Only 5

4
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CIA World Factbook, 2013

countries in the world have military expenditures above 7.5%5 North Korea is not listed
in the CIA World Factbook due to the uncertain nature of their statistics. Despite this, we
still know that the DPRK's military expenditures far surpass that of other countries. The

DPRK officially claims that they spend approximately 15% GDP per year.56 In 2003,

outside experts assessed the DPRK's military spending as approximately 27.2%.7 While

the DPRK's military spending far outstrips any other country percentage-wise, their
overall economy does not stack up. The DPRK is the 103rd largest economy in the world
with the 49th largest population in the world.8 North Korea exemplifies the perennial

economic question of guns versus butter. The guns versus butter debate is a simplified
question of how a country splits its monetary resources between military spending and

supporting their population. Based on current statistics and historical precedent, most

countries tend to invest more in butter related items, possibly because butter involves

more aspects than guns do. Overspending on the military is a major cause of North
Korea's other economic problems.
When the government overspends on guns, they fail to invest in social support
programs or even ensure that their population receives the basic amount of nutrition

necessary to life such as in North Korea. While the food situation in North Korea is not
nearly as severe as it was during the mid-1990s. it still produces many negative

consequences for the average North Korean citizen. A general lack of proper nutrition.

5

CIA World Factbook. 2013

Nanto. Dick K and Chanlett-Avery. Emma. ‘‘North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy
Analysis”. Congressional Research Service. January 22. 2010.
7 Nanto and Chanlett-Avery, 2010.
8
CIA World Factbook. 2013
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sometimes reaching famine heights, is the most common cause for desertion from North
9

Korea with approximately 55% of defectors citing the above reason. As a communist

country, people receive their goods from a public distribution system set up from an
aggregate. Since the 1950s. the public distribution system has been designed to supply

North Korean citizens with 60 - 70% of their food.9
10 Because of the communist nature of

the state, when the distribution system broke down, the people had no way to obtain food
from other sources besides scrounging the countryside for supplements such as weeds.11

In 1997. the PDS only provided sustenance to approximately 6% of the population and in
1998 effectively no one received food from the PDS.12 While North Korea was receiving

large amounts of food aid from the international community, they still spent nearly a

quarter of their GDP on military expenditures.13 In 1999, the DPRK purchased 40 MiG-

21 fighter aircrafts and eight military helicopters from Kazakhstan.14 While the major

famine caused by repeated, large-scale natural disasters ended over a decade ago, the
North Korean people in the outer provinces still suffer major nutritional deficiencies. In
2011. a US NGO group traveled to North Korea and found multiple instances seven-year-

old children that weighed only 15 pounds.15 They also reported that 60% of the
population in the outer provinces has to rely on “alternative sustenance” such as weeds

and tree bark to survive because the PDS was unable to meet their nutritional needs.16
Besides the obvious human rights problems inherent in this scenario, it is

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
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182.

impossible for North Korea to thrive as a country if a large percentage of the country
cannot function due to lack of nutrition. This is especially true as while the worst of the

famine finished over a decade ago, but North Korea still faces major food problems.
Malnutrition has caused a multitude of diseases that have resulted in lasting effects for

the population and their ability to function as a country. First, malnutrition on this scale
has had a major effect on future generations. Since the famine, conception rates have
fallen, miscarriages have increased, stillbirths have increased, and overall infant mortality

has increased.17 Children bom during or slightly before the famine have undergone
lasting effects from the famine. A 2004 study found that, on average, a seven-year-old

South Korean boy is 4'1“ and 57 pounds while his northern counterpart is only 3'5’' and

35 pounds.18 Adult bodies are slightly more resilient to the effects of malnutrition as they
have already finished growing. However, they still suffer weakened immune systems

which allows them to catch slightly dangerous diseases more easily than other people.19

Additionally, during the worst of the famine, it was not uncommon for people to suffer
long-term brain psychological damage or declines in brain function.20 Obviously, these

health problems present problems for the country as a whole. Workers cannot function or
help improve a country' under these circumstances. Beside this, all people of a country

deserve a chance to the basic necessities of life. Overall, North Korea is failing

economically. The North Korean government appears to recognize the failings of their

economic system. However, barring a surfeit of natural disasters as during the 1990s. the
situation is better than the past. That said, the economic situation cannot improve unless

17
18
19
20
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there are dramatic changes to the structure of the country's political and economic
institutions.

The Institutional Theory of Economic Growth

Economic growth theory has divides countries into two broad spectra: inclusive
and extractive economies which are in turn based on either inclusive or extractive

institutions. A previously accepted theory of growth was the geography theory which

stated that any country's economic future was predetermined by its geographic location.
One aspect of the theory states that countries in the tropics, defined as the area between

the Tropic of Cancer in the north and the Tropic of Capricorn in the south. This is due to

a culture of laziness or lack or work ethic which results from the tropical environment, a

poor environment for agriculture, and an abundance of diseases which flourish in most
tropical regions.

A second major aspect is that the geographic terrain within any

country worldwide is a predictor of its success. Therefore, according to this theory, the
DPRK's rich mineral deposits should produce a much stronger economy on the world

stage than it currently enjoys, even considering their small supply of arable farmland.

This theory has many weak points. First, “there is no simple or enduring connection
between climate or geography and economic success" based on historical precedent22
Prior to European colonization, the American tropics were much more advanced than the

more temperate zones in the Western Hemisphere. The Aztecs and Incas “were

politically centralized and complex, built roads, and provided famine relief" and the21
22

21
Acemoglu & Robinson. 49
22 Acemoglu & Robinson. 49-50.
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Aztecs had money and writing"3. In contrast, what would later become the United States.

Canada. Argentina, and Chile "were mostly inhabited by Stone Age civilizations lacking
these technologies".23
24 Secondly, tropical diseases cannot be blamed for current economic

trends based on Earth's history. Tropical soil and diseases have not suddenly transformed

from ancient times to current. In fact, given advances in medicine, even among poor and
underdeveloped countries, tropical diseases pose less of a challenge today than they did

2000 years ago. Additionally, the authors claim that tropical diseases are a byproduct or
poverty. not poverty a byproduct of tropical diseases.25 Prior to its rapid industrialization

and subsequent. England was a "very unhealthy place".2627Following strong investment in
public health. England's overall public health and life expectancy improved dramatically.
Thirdly, and most relevant to this study, man-made political borders disprove the

geography theory. Prior to the Korean War, North and South Korea were one country and
had been for for over a millennium. As a small country, North and Korea have similar

geography throughout. Not only are citizens of both countries descended from the same
people, many people are still alive on either side from when Korea was a unified country.
Despite these similarities. North Korean ‘‘living standards [are] akin to those of a sub-

Saharan African country",27 North Koreans make approximately one-tenth as much as
their South Korean neighbors and life expectancy in North Korea is 10 years less than in

the South. 69 years in the North compared to 79 in the South.2829

23 Acemoglu and Robinson. 50.
24 Acemoglu and Robinson, 50.
25
Acemoglu & Robinson, 51.

26
27
28

Acemoglu & Robinson. 51.
Acemoglu & Robinson, 71.

Acemoglu & Robinson, 71.
29 CIA World Factbook.
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Why Nations Fail.
Why Nations Fail

The institution theory of economic growth is now widely accepted and has

supplanted the geography theory of economic growth. Unlike the geography theory
which fails when considered in relation to the past the institutional theory explains both
modem and ancient economic growth and development, or lack thereof. According to the

institution theory, there are two types of political institutions across the globe: inclusive
and extractive. These political institutions then result in economic institutions of the

same kind. Inclusive political institutions, also known as pluralistic political institutions.

spread political power among "a broad coalition of a plurality of groups" as is often

found in democratic societies. 30 However, inclusive institutions must not only spread

power broadly, but also have "sufficiently centralized and powerful states" who have
overall control in order to achieve economic prosperity.30
31 Extractive political institutions,

on the other hand, “concentrate power in the hands of a narrow elite and place few
constraints on the exercise of this power".3233
A country without a centralized government,

such as Somalia, is neither inclusive nor extractive, but it cannot lead to prosperity for the

country and is therefore sorted into extractive institutions. The generally accepted
definition of a governmental state is “the monopoly of legitimate violence in society”

which is required to "enforce law and order” and “provide public services and encourage

and regulate economic activity/3 Inclusive economic institutions are the logical result
of inclusive political institutions as extractive economic institutions are of extractive
political institutions. When political power shared among a broad base, it is difficult,

30

Acemoglu & Robinson. 80. Why Nations Fail

31

Acemoglu & Robinson. 81. Why Nations Fail

32

Acemoglu & Robinson. 81. Why Nations Fail
Acemoglu & Robinson. 80. Whv Nations Fail

33
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almost impossible, for a small group of people to obtain enough power to create

extractive economic institutions. Likewise, inclusive political institutions are designed to
"constrain [governmental power's] arbitrary exercise" which is the point of extractive
institutions/'4 Additionally, extractive rulers have no incentive to create inclusive

economic institutions because it would “destabilize the extractive political institutions,
opening the way for the emergence of inclusive political institutions".34
35 Overall the two
type of extractive institutions and the two types of inclusive institutions reinforce each

other and create a cycle. A cycle involving inclusive institutions is known as a virtuous
cycle and a cycle involving extractive institutions is known as a vicious cycle. According

to the institutional theory of growth, “nations fail when they have extractive economic
institutions, supported by extractive political institutions that impede or even block

economic growth"36 As will be shown in a later section of this paper, the DPRK has

extractive political and economic institutions.

Extractive Political Institutions within the DPRK

While the DPRK is a considered a dictatorship, it does have a large political
system with separate, easily recognizable parts. The DPRK has an executive, a
legislative, and a judicial branch.37 The executive branch's main body is the Supreme
People's Assembly, within which the Presidium is most exclusive part.38 The legislative

branch is unicameral and all election results are pre-approved by the government. The

34
35

Acemoglu & Robinson, 82. Why Nations Fail
Acemoglu & Robinson. 86. Why Nations Fail

36
Acemoglu & Robinson. 83. Why Nations Fail
37 CIA World Factbook. "North Korea”.
38 CIA World Factbook. “North Korea".
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major party is the Korean Worker's Party (KWP); there are two minor parties—Chondoist
Chongu Party and the Social Democratic Party—but they are controlled by the KWP.39

All major judges within the judicial branch are also pre-approved by the KWP.40
North Korea is currently led by Kim Jong-Un. the third and youngest son of Kim

Jong-Il and grandson of Kim Il-Sung. Kim Jong-Un is believed to be 28 or 29 and Kim
Jong-Il began grooming Kim Jong-un as his successor in approximately 2010 following

concerns for Kim Jong-Il's health.41 As the third son. Kim Jong-Un was not originally

considered a contender for ruler of North Korea. Kim Jong-Nam, Kim Jong-Un's half
brother who appears to be at least a decade older, was the original successor.4243By 2001.

Kim Jong-Nam had proven himself an untenable choice for North Korea. In 2001. Kim
Jong-Nam was detained by Japanese officials at Narita airport for using false

identification.

He was allegedly attempting to enter Japan in order to visit Tokyo

Disneyland with his four-year-old son.44 Although he was already removed from the line

of succession. Kim Jong-Nam has further distanced himself from the North Korean
regime. In 2010. he professed his dislike of the North Korean regime when he said that

hereditary succession did not "fit socialism and my father was against it" but it "was
done to stabilize the framework of the nation” alienating him from his few supporters.45

Previously, a nephew of Kim Jong-Il defected to South Korea and wrote an expose on
North Korea which resulted in his assassination in 1997.46 While Kim Jong-Nam's words

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
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CIA World Factbook ."North Korea”.
CIA World Factbook .“North Korea”.
New York Times. "Kim Jong-Un News” Times Topics-New York Times. 2012.
Kirk. Donald. “North Korea Drama: Where Are Kim Jong-Un's Brothers?” ABCnews. 2011.
Kirk “North Korea". 2011
Kirk “North Korea". 2011
Kirk “North Korea". 2011
Kirk “North Korea”. 2011

are not as dangerous as defecting to South Korea, he still put himself at risk in regards to

the regime. Currently. Kim Jong-Nam lives in Macao, off the coast of China.47 Kim

Jong-Chol. Kim Jong-Un's full brother, is approximately two years older than him and
much less controversial.48 Kim Jong-Il is believed to have passed over Kim Jong-Chol

because of his "unmanliness" and "love for decadent western pop".4950
All three Kim
brothers are believed to have attended the International School of Berne in Switzerland.50
While Kim Jong-Nam attributes his anti-communist views to his Swiss education, Kim
Jong-Un has thus far exhibited none of said behavior. After attending school in

Switzerland Kim Jong-Un attended Kim Il-Sung Military University, "a leading officer

training school in Pyongyang”, from 2002-2007. but was taught at home.51
As a relatively new leader to a country with an established, rigid hierarchy, Kim
Jong-Un faced many difficulties following his father's death. While Kim Jong-Il was

groomed as future head-of-state for nearly 20 years, Kim Jong-Un was much less

prepared. While preparing for leadership Kim Jong-Il "terrorized the older elite and won
their grudging respect in a process of consolidating absolute power”.5253
54After Kim Jong-

Il's stroke in 2008. Kim Jong-Un was put on the fast-track for advancement, beginning

full speed in 2010.53 Before 2010. there were no official photographs of Kim Jong-Un,

excluding a single photo from elementary school.54 Following his public introduction,
besides being Kim Jong-Il's son, Kim Jong-Un's public image was greatly helped by his
47 Kirk “North Korea”. 2011
48 Profile. Kim Jong-Un, BBC News. July 25. 2012. http://www bbc.co.uk/news'world-asia-pacific11388628
49 Kirk “North Korea”. 2011
50 “Profile.” BBC.
51 New York Times. “Kim Jong-Un News”
52 New York Times. "Kim Jong-Un News”
53 New York Times. “Kim Jong-Un News”
54 New York Times. “Kim Jong-Un News”
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strong resemblance with his grandfather.55 While in public Kim Jong-Un normally wore

Mao suits similar to Kim Il-Sung and wore his hair in a similar fashion?6 Following his
first appearance on national media, many Western media outlets began claiming Kim

Jong-Un had plastic surgery to increase his resemblance with Kim Il-Sung in an effort to
ease his transition.57 Resemblance between immediate family members is not unusual

and since Kim Jong-Un's ascension to Supreme Leader of North Korea in December 2011
media outlets have ceased such speculation. While the idea of plastic surgery is highly

unlikely, the marked resemblance between grandfather and grandson, including
mannerisms, is likely a strategic decision by the North Korean government in order to

facilitate Kim Jong-Un to power by reminding the people of their prosperous past.
Currently, North Korean media portrays Kim Jong-Un as a "confident, modem leader in
tune with the daily concerns of citizens".58 By using the personality cult machine to in

conjunction with fashioning Kim Jong-Un after his grandfather, Kim Jong-Un is accepted
more easily by his citizens. This is important since his transition to power was extremely

short, especially compared to the transition between Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il.

As a dictatorship that perpetuates personality cults of the leaders among ordinary
citizens, public opposition never posed a problem to Kim Jong-Un's succession. Kim

Jong-Un s main challenge was to convince the military of his ability to lead the country.
While Kim Jong-Un reportedly attending Kim Il-Sung Military University, he is not
believed to have any firsthand military experience. This stands in sharp contrast to Kim55
58
57
56

55 New York Times. “Kim Jong-Un News”
56 New York Times, “Kim Jong-Un News"
57 Julian Ryall. Kim Jong-Un Rumoured to Have Undergone Plastic Surgery.’ Telegraph.co.uk. October
5. 2010. http.//www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8042865/Kim-Jong-unrumoured-to-have-undergone-plastic-sur2ery.html
58 "Profile." BBC.
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Jong-Un's grandfather who founded the DPRK after fighting Japanese guerrillas for
decades.59 Despite this. Kim Jong-Un was appointed as a four-star general in 2010.59
60.

Later that year he was also appointed deputy chairman of the Central Military
Commission of the Worker's Party.6162
63On March 26, 2010, North Koreans sank the South
Korean ship the Cheonan6' The attack was reportedly organized and implemented by
Kim Jong-Un in an effort to improve his reputation with the Korean People's Army.63

Immediately following Kim Jong-Il's death, Kim Jong-Un was hailed as the "Great
Successor".6465By April 2012. Kim Jong-Un was given many titles to solidify his standing

in North Korea. Kim Jong-Un is officially the First Secretary of the Worker's Party’ of
Korea, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, First Chairman of the National

Defense Commission of North Korea, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's
Army, a member of the Politburo and its presidium, and is publicly referred to as the
Supreme Leader.65

While Kim Jong-Un is the overall leader of North Korea, the amount of decision

making power he actually has over the country is unknown. Given the short period of
time since Kim Jong-Il's death and Kim Jong-Un's lack of experience, the same power

structure is likely still largely in place. Kim Jong-Il's sister and brother-in-law both wield
large amounts of power within the country and are believed to be a driving force behind

smoothing Kim Jong-Un's acceptance in the Korean politics and military and promoting

59 Choe. Sang-hun, “As Rocket Launching Nears. North Korea Continues Shift to New ’Supreme
Leader"'. New York Times, April 11. 2012
60 Cha. 101.
61 Cha. 101.
62 Cha. 105.
63 Cha. 105.
64 “Profile," BBC.
65 New York Times, “Kim Jong-Un News".
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their own interests. As with Kim Jong-Il's regime, good deeds and assistance to the
leader is not unrewarded. As Kim Jong-Il's sister and brother-in-law, Kim Kyung-hee

and Jang Song-Taek already had high positions within the regime. Following their
support of Kim Jong-Un they were rewarded even farther. Kim Kyung-hee, Kim Jong-Il's
sister who was extremely close with him before his death, was promoted to four-star

general in the Korean army.6667
70Jang Song-Taek, Kim Jong-Un's uncle, was named vice
69
68
chairman of the National Defense Commission, North Korea's highest decision making

body. 67 During Kim Jong-Il's funeral, Kim Jong-Un was flanked by his uncle Jang SongTaek and Ri Yong-Ho, the chief of the general staff of the Korean People's Army and
Vice Marshal.

This represents how highly the regime considered Vice Marshal Ri;

however. Ri Yong-Ho was removed from all of his positions within North Korea in July

2012 for health reasons."69 Based on outward appearance, Vice Marshal Ri was quite
vigorous and healthy compared to the majority of leaders within North Korea leading

credence to the belief that Vice Marshal Ri was fired because he disagreed with the

regime.

The use and subsequent discarding of high-ranking officials has long been the

Kim family s favorite tool of control — using and discarding the senior officials around

him like pawns on a chessboard".71 Prior to Ri Yong-Ho's dismissal, Kim Jong-Un had

not lived up to this expectation. Here, Kim Jong-Un is removing one of the stepping

stones of his ascension to power and following in his family's tradition which is
indicative that his control over the regime is tightening.
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The exact role of the military within the DPRK is unknown. Although the DPRK

is classified as a classless, socialist society. there are three main categories and 51 subsets

of the population under the public distribution system (PDS) used for food distribution

across the country. 72 The military elite are members of one of the highest subsets, but
even lower military members still enjoy a status above the average citizen.72
73 From this
we can see that the military is treated differently, but specifics beyond this are unclear.

Ideology Versus Economics Within North Korea
North Korea's current economic problems stem from multiple sources. Among them,
stressing ideology over sound economics is the largest. Ideology can be further divided

into two types: juche and chollima. Juche, self reliance, is the major form of ideology
found in North Korea. As is obvious from the name, under the Juche system, North
Korea must grow as a country and provide for all of its citizens solely through its own

efforts and cannot rely on outside assistance. While Juche does rule over the lives of
everyday people and how their government deals with them, the government seems to

have no problem accepting help under certain circumstances. In recent years, the DPRK

has proven particularly fond of coercing other countries to provide assistance through
threats of nuclear activity or missile tests. An offshoot of juche that produced similar
negative consequences is Chollima. This is the belief that through the “revolutionary

zeal of North Korean citizens, the country would experience what can only be described

as superhuman productivity gains’ thus propelling the North Korean economy beyond

72 Cha. 183.
73 Cha. 183.
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the frontier of any other country.7475Under Chollima, the “revolutionary zeal" meant that
all people needed to work extreme hours with older equipment and methodologies.75
This idea was doomed to failure under the basic precepts of economics. The growth in

North Korea at the time is textbook extractive growth policies. As discussed earlier,
North Korea has very extractive political institutions which have resulted in extractive
economic institutions. Extractive institutions do not invest in future growth or

technological progress and often simply through more people at a problem, such as with

the Chollima movement. One of the most basic ideas of economics is the law of
diminishing returns which states that each additional unit produces less positive than the

previous unit. That is not to say that an additional unit causes productivity to decrease,
although it can at a certain point, but that the additional worker is not as useful. The

classic example is cooks in a kitchen. The additional output from no cook to a single
cook will produce the most benefit to the kitchen. The next cook helps the kitchen run

more efficiently and specialization can begin, but at some point the kitchen will have too
many cooks and it will spoil the soup. This law has two parts. Besides the overallocation

of human capital, especially untrained human capital, a major cause of economic decline
in North Korea was their lack of investment in technology. Because of their focus on

“revolutionary zeal , the North Korean government did not invest in technology.

Following the initial rebuilding efforts following the Korean War, many of which were at
least partially subsidized by the USSR or China, and into the 1960s, the North Korean
government seemed content with the technology they had and did not account for
depreciation of capital assets or general upkeep necessary to keep the technology working
74 Cha. 115.
75 Cha. 115.

at maximum efficiency76. Besides not investing in upkeep, the DPRK did not invest in

keeping up with the technological frontier. Within the global economy, there are
countries that innovate and countries that imitate. Imitators and innovators refer to
technology used in order to produce some good or service which builds an economy.
Countries that innovate define the technological frontier and continually push it forward
in order to allow economic growth for the countries that follow. Even if the DPRK did

not innovate and relied solely on imitations of relatively recent outside technology to spur

economic growth, their economy would be exponentially better.
North Korea's struggles powering the country are a microcosm illustrating how

juche and Chollima severely limit North Korea's economic options. During the 1970s.
North Korea decided to build multiple large coal-burning power plants.77 First, North

Korea built the Pyongyang Thermal Power Plant and then the Pukch'ang Thermal Plant,

financed mainly through foreign assistance.7879
80While these power plants were new, the

related technology was not updated to match. Coal plants are much more expensive to
build and run than oil burning plants; however, based on juche, North Korea decided to
build coal plants. On the surface, this is logical as the DPRK has large coal deposits,
especially for a country of its relatively small size, but their coal mining technology was
"antiquated.”7980 As per Chollima, North Korea decided to throw more and more people

at a problem instead of updating their technology. North Korea threw more and more
people toward mining, but they were only able to excavate 5-6 tons of coal of day while
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through the use of up-to-date technology, the West could produce "exponentially” more

with only two workers.81 In the 1970s, the DPRK finished building a hydroelectric

power plant with a max capacity of 4.4 million kilowatts, but they were only able to
produce a maximum of 250.000 kilowatts, barely 5% of the optimal output. 82 Beside

limiting the production capability, the DPRK wasted a large amount of money on a
project with no return on investment. This exemplifies how the self reliance and

revolutionary zeal ideas not only failed to help the country, but in fact produced many

negative results.

History of Extractive Economic Growth in the DPRK
The DPRK's Military and National Security Policy as Related to Economic Growth

The DPRK and WMDs:
North Korea's nuclear capabilities are their most commonly mentioned WMD83.

North Korea previously conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009.84 They currently

"possesses full nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, including a presumed basic capability to
enrich uranium” and enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) to produce 10 nuclear
warheads.

North Korea is currently believed to have 2,500-5,000 metric tons of chemical
weapons and is not a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). North
81 Cha. 115.
82 Cha. 115.
83
As the DPRK hides most aspects of its WMD program, exact and accurate information is
unavailable.
84
"Overview of North Korea.’’ NTl.org. November 2012. http://www.nti.org/ country-profiles/north-

korea/
85 "Overview." NTI.org.
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Korea has signed the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Geneva Protocol
prohibiting the development, use or stockpile of biological weapons, but experts believe
that North Korea has a biological weapons program.86 In the 1990s, defectors from North

Korea had antibodies from a smallpox vaccine in their bodies.87 This would indicate that
North Korea has access to smallpox and likely begun vaccinations in order to protect

their own people. Anthrax also grows naturally in the soil of some regions in North

Korea, but it must be further cultivated to meet weapons grade standards.88 Based on this

evidence. North Korea is pursuing some form of biological weapons.
In addition to the threat of nuclear weapons themselves. North Korea actively

seeks advanced weapons system to deliver nuclear warheads. When the United States
used nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, they flew airplanes over the desired

target and dropped the bomb, hoping it would hit the intended target. This method is
considered highly unwieldy and inaccurate; the American bomb over Nagasaki exploded

in the air before reaching its desired destination.89 Now, nuclear bombs are created into
‘•miniaturized warheads that can be placed on the top of a long-range missile” and

strategically target a specific target.90 There a three types of missiles: short range
ballistic missiles, intermediate range ballistic missiles, and intercontinental ballistic

missiles. Reports on the quality of North Korean missiles vary; however, they are not
currently' advanced, nor is the DPRK's nuclear technology advanced enough, to utilized
miniaturized warheads in conjunction with ICBMs to attack distant place with nuclear
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Some of the technology North Korea showcased during their April 2012 missile

test has been attributed to China.93 Six transporter-erector launchers (TELs) that

outwardly appeared Chinese or based closely on Chinese design were photographed. It is
unclear how the DPRK gained manufactured these TELs. The possibilities include
buying TELs from a Chinese company, receiving direct Chinese aid or reverse
engineering the products without external help. TELs are important to the North Korean

nuclear and missile program. TELs allow North Korea to have mobile missiles that are
not tied to specific, easily targeted silos.9491
94
93
92
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Chapter II: The China-DPRK Relationship
Political Ties

China may currently be considered the DPRK's closest ally, but the DPRK is not
China's closest ally. This creates an interesting and dynamic relationship between the two
countries in all aspects. China and North Korea face the world overall capitalist and

democratic world as two of the last communist states. China and North Korea were

founded under similar circumstances. While both countries are classified as communist,
their governments exhibit many differences. China is currently transitioning from the
leadership of Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. Power is spread across China much more broadly

than North Korea which is classified as a communist one-man dictatorship.
The current head of the DPRK, Kim Jong-Un, only succeeded his father Kim
Jong-Il in December 2011 and his control over the party is likely not as complete. While

North Korea is a dictatorship, there are many people working under him within the Korea
Workers' Party to rule the country, but their power is limited compared to Kim Jong-Un.

As the DPRK's closest ally, the Chinese government frequently interacts with

North Korea and attempts to influence North Korea. China's demands of North Korea
can be summarized by the "5 no's": "no instability [on the peninsula], no collapse, no
nukes, no refugees or defectors [fleeing across the border into China], and no conflict

95 CIA World Factbook.
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escalation".96 Based on empirical evidence, it appears that North Korea has not listened

to China on any of these issues: however, one must ask whether North Korea has not
listened to China at all or whether the levels in recent years have been lower than they
would have without the influence of China. In the past, their alliance was strong enough,
and China's intentions were clear enough, that China supported North Korea during the

Korean War. but ties were less clear cut after that. During the Cold War, North Korea
used both China and the Soviet Union, the other main communist countries in the world
in order to support their regime. In the early 1990s, North Korean relations with both
countries faltered. The Soviet Union was officially dissolved in December 1991. In

1992. China and North Korea entered a “lost decade’’ after China's “great betrayal” where
they formally recognized South Korea and established political ties.97 China's actions in

the aftermath of Kim Jong-Il's death show that despite their other problems, China is
likely to continue some level of support to North Korea. In December 2011, shortly after

Kim Jong-Il's death. Hu Jintao personally went to Pyongyang in order to express his

condolences and show support for Kim Jong-Un, the new leader of North Korea and Kim
Jong-Il's youngest son.98. Hu Jintao expressed his hope that North Koreans will “remain
united and turn their sorrow into strength”.99 On one hand, this statement could be

considered as support for North Korea; on the other hand, Hu Jintao could easily be
expressing his hope that North Koreans will united behind Kim Jong-Un as the new

leader in an effort to save China the trouble of extricating North Korea from another
96 Choo. Jaewoo. Congressional research service. "Mirroring North Korea's Growing Economic
Dependence On China: Political Ramifications.” Last modified 2008.
97
Funabashi. 265.
98 "Hu Jintao visits Beijing’s North Korean Embassy as China Backs Kim Jong Un.” Bloomberg.com.
December 19. 2011, http:/^vww.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-20/hu-jintao-visits-beijing-s-northkorean-embassy-as-china-backs-kim-jong-un.html
99 “Hu Jintao Visits”. Bloomberg.com.
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mess. Within the past decade. China and North Korea have visited each other regularly.
In the two years prior to his death. Kim Jong-Il made three known visits to China.100 Hu

Jintao has also visited North Korea numerous times throughout his term as General
Secretary of the CCP.

Of the 'Five no's', the most important no is to avoid regime collapse as the DPRK

serves as a buffer zone between China and American and NATO-allied troops stationed at

the DMZ between North and South Korea.101 Following DPRK's nuke test #1, some
analysts and think tanks have questioned the necessity of North Korea as a buffer zone
between the PRC and the West as represented by South Korea.102 As the Cold War ended
20 years ago. buffer countries between communist and democratic states is no longer as

all important.103 Additionally. North Korea's erratic behavior could result in harm to
China or Chinese citizens in the future. For example, North Korea places many of its
nuclear reactors along its northern border and any accidents, or attacks on said reactors,

could result in a major problem for China and harm a large number of Chinese citizens.

As China is the DPRK's only ally on the international stage and a major provider

of aid. they play a major role in the DPRK's continued survival. On the surface, it would
appear that China holds all the power in the relationship, but because China needs North
Korea to exist in order to secure its own borders and the North Korean government

realizes this. China has no power in the relationship and must continue aiding North
Korea.104
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Military Ties

China and North Korea's modem relationship began through their military ties starting
with the buildup to the Korean War. North Korea borders China along its northeast

provinces at the Yalu and Tumen Rivers. During the Cold War, many scholars believed

that China aided North Korea simply because they were both Communist countries, but
reality is more complicated. One reason that China allied with North Korea is because
Chinese officials feared for the safety of their nation if UN forces continued northward.

This made sense for the Chinese based on historical precedence and the current situation
around the world. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, which

includes World War II in the Pacific theater, the Japanese first invaded Korea and
established bases.105 The Japanese then moved into China and established bases there.105
106

Additionally, in the 1940-50s America was experiencing the Red Scare and anti
communist feelings ran high. Based on the anti-Chinese attitudes in the Western world
and China's history with the Japanese, China repeatedly warned the US and UN troops

not to cross the 38th and only joined the Korean War “after all warnings had been ignored
by Washington and General Douglas MacArthur".107108
President Truman threatened to use

the atomic bomb at the China-North Korean border and General Bolte, the chief of

operations in Korea, believed that up to ‘10-20 [atomic] bombs could be spared for
Korea .

However, the US decided against nuclear weapons for two reasons. First,

they believed they could win the war through conventional means.109 Second, the world
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opinion regarding the American use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was
low and deterred U.S. leaders from authorizing a nuclear strike.110 Many people

currently incorrectly anchor their understanding of China's military strength during the

Korean War on the PLA's current military might. At the time, China faced many
challenges both internal and external.
Beside the outside threat Allied forces posed against China if they entered the war,

China faced many domestic issues. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had only
founded the People's Republic of China (PRC, China) on October 1,1949, a few months
before the beginning of the Korea War. The CCP had yet to consolidate their hold over

the country. After the civil war against the Chinese Nationalist Party, the CCP needed to
help the economy recover from the effects of war and deal with the Nationalist presence

left within the country and Taiwan.111 The Korean War acted as a unifying element

within China. 1.45 million Chinese fought in the Korean War and 300,000 troops were
stationed in North Korea for five years following the war.112113
While there, the PLA among
other Chinese citizens sent by the government, helped with reconstruction and skill
training.11? Many veterans are still alive who remember the Korean War and their service

in it fondly as evidenced throughout the Chinese name of the Korean War, the "War to

resist America and assist Korea".114 Overall, the Chinese viewed the Korean War in a
positive light.
China is currently under obligation to defend North Korea militarily if necessary’.
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In 1961. China and North Korea signed the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship.

Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. The goal of the treaty is ‘‘to safeguard and
consolidate the peace of Asia and the world, and deeply convinced that the development

and strengthening of the relations of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance

between the two countries".115 Article V of the treaty states that China and North Korea
"will continue to render each other every possible economic and technical aid in the
cause of socialist construction of the two countries and will continue to consolidate and

develop economic, cultural, and scientific and technical co-operation between the two
countries".115
116 Given the differences in economic, military, and political power, this treaty
strongly favors North Korea. The overarching theme of the treat is that ‘'China is obliged

to defend North Korea against unprovoked aggression”.117 China is aware of the
imbalances in the relationship and "conceives itself to have the right to make an

authoritative interpretation of the principle for intervention”.118 Tang Jiaxuan, former
foreign minister of China referred to the clause as ‘'a remnant of Cold War era thinking
and no longer relevant to the current situation”.119 The world and China-North Korean

relations have changed since 1961 though; China “now places more value on national
interest over alliances blinded by ideology”.120 Therefore, while China is nominally

bound to help North Korea under the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual

115
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Assistance, experts believe that China will not aid North Korea militarily unless Beijing
wants to.

Another aspect of China and North Korea's military ties is how China deals with
North Korea's aggressive actions toward other countries. First, there is the Chinese
political reaction to North Korean military actions. The most recent attack happened in

2010 when North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island in the "first artillery strike on South
Korean soil since the Korean War".121 The attack killed 2 South Korean soldiers and
wounded 15 soldiers and 3 civilians.122 The North blamed the South for inciting the

attack through their Safeguarding the Nation military drill.123 Earlier that year in March,
the South Korean submarine Choenan was sunk; the South Koreans blame the North

Koreans, but the North Koreans claim no responsibility.124125
126
Based on Beijing's official
response to the attack that ‘the situation needs to be verified'’, North Korea did not
forewarn China of the attack.125 This is not the first time that North Korean actions have

caught China unaware. This causes some experts to believe that China has little influence

over North Korea's military and some people go so far to say that China's lack of outward

126
response to North Korea's attacks paint china as North Korea's “enabler".126

Additionally, China occasionally follows North Korea's lead regarding military actions
and consequences.

Secondly, while the Chinese government appears to enable North Korea's military
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policies, the PLA's known relationship with the DPRK's military shows little evidence of

special ties. Based on the PLA(N)'s involvement with the DPRK's military. China cannot

be considered a true enabler of North Korea's military policies. Military exchanges are a

major part of any government's bilateral exchanges to foster fraternity amongst their
armed forces. According to China's 2010 Defense White Paper, they conduct military

exchanges with other countries based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence—
"mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non

interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful
coexistence".1-7 Exact figures are unavailable regarding official PLA delegations to the

DPRK or vice versa. The Chinese government announced that in July. 1996, a PLAN
ship conducted a 'major overseas visit" to the DPRK.127
128 Additionally, the Chinese

Defense Minister visited the DPRK in July 2006.129 The military released the general

figures the "the PLA has dispatched 33 batches (times) of high-level delegations to visit

neighboring countries and received 38 senior military delegations from its neighboring
countries since 2007" (current to 2009), but it did not release specific figures regarding
which countries were engaged when.130* Chinese media outlets frequently mention that

the Chinese government and the PLA are aligning with other countries, especially in the
region, and training them and helping them improve, but media outlets generally lack any

specific data regarding which countries were visited and the duration of said visits.
127
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moved from the traditional centrally planned economy of communist countries to one

which combined the traditional command economy with select market characteristics
which was branded "socialism with Chinese characteristics" by Deng Xiaoping.1’14 The
North Korean government considered this policy “revisionism" and a betrayal of their

communist background and shifted much of their trade to the Soviet Union as a result.134
135136
138
137

For most of the 1980s. trade between China and North Korea was in the $400-500 million
range.116 After the fall of the Soviet Union, trade between the DPRK and China quickly
increased. In 2008. bilateral trade reached $2.79 billion, up 41.3% compared to 2007.137
In 2009. China provided 90% of North Korea's energy imports and 45% of their food

imports.138 As a whole, the DPRK bought about half of its imports from China and sold

approximately a quarter of their exports to China.139140
141
Trade for 2011 rose to $3.47 billion,
an increase of nearly a billion from 2OO9.140141. The DPRK exports include “minerals,
metallurgical products, manufactures (including armaments), textiles, agricultural and

fishery products".142143
The DPRK imports mainly “petroleum, cooking coal, machinery

and equipment, textiles, [and] grain".143 In 2010, the DPRK's bought 64.5% of its
imports from China and 24.6% from South Korea.144 The same year, they sold 46.5% of
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their exports to China and 40.8% to South Korea.145 In 2010. bilateral trade with China
was approximately 8.6% of the DPRK's overall GDP.145
146 Overall. China is a major player

in the North Korean economy; however, this does not give China any major leverage over

North Korea as is discussed further in the political section.

Table I. China’s Merchandise Trade with the DPRK, 1995-2009
($ in millions)
Year

China's Imports

China's Exports

Total Trade

China's Balance

1995

63.609

486.037

549.646

422.428

1996

68.638

497.014

565.652

428.376

1997

121.610

534.411

656.021

412.801

1998

51.089

356.661

407.750

305.572

1999

41.722

328.634

370.356

286.912

2000

37.214

450.839

488.053

413.625

2001

166.797

570.660

737.457

403.863

2002

270.863

467.309

738.172

196.446

2003

395.546

627.995

1,023.541

232.449

2004

582.193

794.525

1,376.718

212.332

2005

496.51 1

1.084.723

1,581234

588212

2006

467.718

1.231.886

1.699.604

764.168

2007

581.521

1.392.453

1.973.974

810.932

2008

754.045

2.033233

2.787278

1279.188

2009

793.026

1,887.741

1680.767

1.094.715

Source: China. Ministry of Commence (excludes Hong Kong and Macau).

Bilateral trade is not the only facet of China and North Korea's economic ties.
Through much of their shared history’, China has given North Korea economic and

humanitarian aid when North Korea's economy was suffering. During the 1990s China
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and North Korean aid relations were not friendly. After Deng Xiaoping encouraged

China to focus on financial pragmatism regarding foreign countries, North Korea did not
receive as many benefits. North Korea had bought many of its imports from China on
credit and had trouble making payments; therefore, China demanded hard currency as

payment in order to avoid North Korea defaulting on their loans.147 While this may seem

like China was unkind to North Korea, the majority of products China exported to North
Korea were discounted with a "friendship price”.148149
151
150
Under the friendship price policy,
North Korea bought grains and oil at a third of the going price and other consumer goods

at up to an 80% discount.149 Upon formally recognizing South Korea, China became
more "economically rational” when dealing with the North.150 Then, China did not offer
friendship prices anymore and expected the DPRK to pay off their loans, including

interest.151
In conclusion. China and North Korea's economic relation has changed; China is
currently treating North Korea in a manner similar to other countries as evidenced by the

termination of friendship prices. However, China's economic support forms a backbone
for the North Korean economy and cannot be removed without significant harm to the

country, including possible destabilization. Through increased trade and investment in
North Korea. China is able to direct the North Korean economy on a small scale, but
China lacks significant leverage over the North Korean economy.

147
148
149
150
151

38

Choo. "Mirroring’'.
Choo. "Mirroring".
Choo. "Mirroring”.
Cha. 301.
Cha. 301.

Levers
China, the DPRK, and WMDs
Chinese and North Korean views regarding WMDs on the Korean peninsula vary
greatly. Through their continual pursuit of nuclear weapons. North Korea's exhibits an

obvious desire to become a strong nuclear power. Following a failed rocket launch in

April 2012. North Korea amended their national constitution to officially declare
themselves a nuclear-armed nation.152 In February 2012, the DPRK held its third nuclear
test. The Korean Central News Agency, North Korea's official news outlet, stated
"The test was carried out as part of practical measures of counteraction to defend
the country's security and sovereignty in the face of the ferocious hostile act of the

U.S. which wantonly violated the DPRK's legitimate right to launch satellite for

peaceful purposes....The test was conducted in a safe and perfect way on a high

level with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb unlike the previous ones, yet with
great explosive power".153
The Chinese government's official response to this test was "On 12 February
2013. the DPRK conducted another nuclear test in disregard of the common opposition of

the international community...the Chinese government is firmly opposed to this act”.154

China's officially advocates
"resolving the nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula peacefully through dialogues

and consultations, endeavoring to balance common concerns through holding sixparty talks in order to realize the denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and
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maintain peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and the Northeast Asia".155

China’s policy evolved not only from worry regarding what Kim Jong-Il would

possibly do with a nuclear weapon, but also how other countries would react to a nuclear
armed DPRK. The largest danger to China itself was the location of North Korea's
nuclear facilities which were located along the China-North Korean border.136 China

feared that an .American or NATO attack would cause damage on the Chinese side of the

border and draw China into an unwanted war.137 Another, generally unspoken, worry was
that Japan would go nuclear as well if North Korea did.158 China and Japan have a

mutual history of distrust and fighting which, in the event of nuclear weapons in Japan,

would make China one of Japan's largest targets.139 While this is one of China's main
worries. Japan has repeatedly stated that it "shall neither possess nor manufacture nuclear

weapons, nor shall it permit their introduction into Japanese territory” as a result of the
American attacks on Japan at the end of World War II.155
160 When North Korea tested a
159
158
157
156

nuclear weapon in 2009 and did not inform Beijing ahead of time, an American official
with the Department of State familiar with the matter stated that “Pyongyang has spit in

the [People's Republic of China's] eye.”161 Experts consider North Korea's disregard for
China's nuclear stance as a main reason that China has been pushing for hard sanctions
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against North Korea.162 Despite China's strict condemnations of the DPRK's WMD and
missile program, a 2007 report by the CIA stated that private Chinese businesses continue
to sell materials, manufacturing equipment, and components suitable for use in ballistic

missile, chemical weapon and nuclear weapon programs to North Korea".

163

Additionally. China classifies much of their trade with North Korea as “economic

development and humanitarian activities'* which are allowed under UN sanctions.164
Overall. China overtly disapproves of the DPRK's nuclear program and facilitate talks

between the DPRK and the world discussing disarmament. On the other hand, when it
comes to global sanctions against North Korea in an effort to give them an incentive to
eliminate their weapons program. China ignores said sanctions when it benefits them.
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Chapter III: Scenarios Regarding the Future of North Korea
Key Assumptions Check:
1.

The leaders of the DPRK will act in a rational manner to ensure the survival of the
DPRK regime.

Solid. While the world may stereotype the DPRK as a country of crazy
people, their leadership has actually acted in a rational manner as is consistent
with their culture and situation at the time. As mentioned above, the DPRK

believes that nuclear weapons are necessary for regime survival and continues
to manufacture and test nuclear weapons and related technology. The DPRK

has not historically acted in a manner inconsistent with their culture and

worldview; therefore, it is logically consistent to assume that the DPRK will
continue to do so.
2. The DPRK will follow their historical behavior pattern of escalation of conflict

followed by an abrupt ending to forestall any non-political conflict

Caveated. The caveat is that the leaders of the DPRK will act in a rational

manner, as described above.
3. China will be involved in the DPRK in some manner, no matter which path the

DPRK chooses.
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Supported. First. China is currently bound to defend North Korea by the
Treaty of Friendship. Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Second, no matter

what China's opinion on North Korea is. the majority of the world considers

North Korea to be China's problem. Third. China currently has significant
trade ties with North Korea. While North Korea is far from China's largest

trade partner. China is a major factor involved in keeping North Korea
economically afloat. Based on the combination of the above factors and their

shared border. China will be involved in some manner.

Based on the situation as described above, I judge with moderate confidence that North
Korea's overall situation will remain at a status quo within the next two years. The
DPRK’s actions over the the past month and a half have indicated a possible deterioration
of the security situation on the peninsula: however, I judge with moderate to high

confidence that the situation will not reach the drastic scale described under scenario 2.

The two alternate scenarios, a drastic deterioration or improvement in conditions, are

both unlikely, but are important to understand fully because of the far-reaching
implications either scenario would have for the world.

Scenario 1: Status Quo
I judge with moderate confidence that the DPRK will remain in a status quo situation for
the next two to five years. As suggested by the name, under this scenario, there will be

no attempt at reform within the DPRK. As a result, the situation within the DPRK and

regarding their relations around the world will remain the same. There can be short
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variations within the scenario while maintaining the status quo moniker.

Indicators:
As this scenario is status quo. it is not defined by special indicators, but rather by a lack
of different material. This scenario would be defined by 1) a lack of increased weapons

testing: 2) the DPRK military does not deviate from their current training regime ; 3)

language in North Korean media outlets remains the same; it does not become either

more threatening or more open to the outside world.

Implications:
This scenario would have the best short-term implications for the world. While most of

the world believes that the relative uncertainty of North Korea's actions has a negative

impact on the global security environment, the world has become used to the situation.
Scenario 2. destabilization of the Korean Peninsula or a severe decline in North Korean

relations with the world, is obviously undesirable, but Scenario 3 also present many

problems.

China’s Role:
On the surface, this scenario would involved the least work, but it would actually
involve significant work on China's part. While outright war is not imminent, given the
recent escalation of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, China must use significant

politicking in order to smooth relations between the DPRK and the rest of the world.
Above all. China will work to ensure that the current Kim regime stays in power as that

ensures a buffer zone between themselves and the possibility of any American or allied
troops stationed at the border between China and Korea. Under this scenario. China
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assumes that any collapse of the Kim regime would result in reunification of North and
South Korea without the possibility of a military coup or other group taking over North

Korea. As a result. American or allied troops would then be able to station troops at the
border between China and a newly reunified Korea. Most importantly, this would be

right on China's doorstep.

Scenario 2: Overall Situation Deteriorates
This scenario has two possibilities: 1) the DPRK initiates war with another
country, likely South Korea or the United States and no internal reform is possible as a
result: 2) the DPRK experiences severe hardship such as during the natural disasters of

the 1990s which make any attempt at internal reform impossible. 1 judge that neither
scenario is likely. As a layperson, it is impossible to accurately predict major
meteorological or geological effects with any accuracy. Statistically speaking, a
concurrence of multiple, large-scale natural disasters is unlikely to occur again in a short

period of time.

Indicators (Current and Future):
The DPRK announced a termination of the ceasefire agreement between themselves and

South Korea effective 11 March 2013.'6' The DPRK tested their third nuclear weapon

less than a month earlier.165
166 The DPRK has also recently acted in accordance with the

typical preparations for traditional warfare. On 7 March 2013 they closed their largest
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trade border with South Korea.167 Around the same time, the DPRK began to cover their
military vehicles in camouflage netting.167
168 As of 25 March 2013, nothing has resulted of

North Korea's talk. Politically speaking. North Korea cannot unilaterally sever the

armistice agreement due to how it was created. That said, if North Korea invades South
Korea as Germany invaded Russia during World War II, that would effectively end the

armistice agreement without following the proper channels. At this time, such an action
appears unlikely.

Implications: Of the three possible scenarios presented, a deterioration of conditions
within North Korea presents the greatest threat to the world. Within this scenario, there
are varying degrees. First, and least, is that the DPRK might attack a single South

Korean place such as the attacks on the Cheonan and Yeonpyeong Island 2010. While the
North did directly attack the South, neither side resorted to war and instead increased

military deals. Second, a traditional war could break out between the two Koreas which

would quickly involve their allies. Third, and most dangerous, is that following an
outbreak of war. the situation could deteriorate into a nuclear conflict. Besides using a

nuclear weapon, the war could become nuclear because one side attempted, or succeeded,
in injuring or eliminating the other side's nuclear plants. Scenarios 2.2 and 2.3 are both

disastrous for the world.

Causes: The most likely preliminary cause of this scenario is the DPRK’s recent satellite
launches and nuclear weapon test. 12 February 2013. in the event that these tests were the
beginning of the DPRK's North Korea’s previous nuclear tests caused international
167
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outrage which resulted in UN sanctions. North Korea declared that the Armistice

Agreement between North and South Korea would be officially voided as of 11 March

2013.

China's Role:
If this scenario occurs. China will have little ability to influence the DPRK. It should be

noted that, if this scenario does occur. China will have worked diligently to prevent it.
China's overall influence over the DPRK is relatively small, but China has traditionally

worked very hard to avoid direct confrontation between the DPRK and the rest of the
world. China's overall goal, as stated over years in multiple forums, is to maintain

regional stability in Northeast Asia. A traditional war near China's border would be
threatening, but the threat of a nuclear war is unacceptable. As explained above, China
has provided major support for the DPRK's economy. With its recent provocative action,

North Korea has threatened to upset China's conditions of support or five no's—no

regime collapse, no instability on the peninsula, no nukes, no refugees, and no escalation
of conflict—and has brought international condemnation upon itself. Following the

February 2013 nuclear test, a spokesman for China stated that China would comply with

international law.169 As of waiting this, international law supports strict economic
sanctions for North Korea in an effort to deter further nuclear activity. Should China

agree to these sanctions as suggested, the economic situation within the DPRK may
suffer a severe downturn or collapse.

Scenario 3: Reform in the DPRK: Overall Situation Improves

169

47

Nightwatch. 8 March 2013.

Indicators:
Indicators of this scenario include 1) mentions of economic reform in DPRK media

outlets: 2) changing how past reforms are discussed: 3) likely increased interaction with
China: and 4) possible changes in the DPRK's security policy. Note: the fourth factor is
only a possibility and is not entirely indicative of any form of economic reform. For
further information, see implications section below.

Implications:
While this scenario would help the DPRK become more in line with international

expectations over the long run. in the short run it would undermine the legitimacy of the

current regime. More specifically, any attempt to legitimately improve the economy

would require a shift from extractive to inclusive economic institutions. As the economic
institutions in a county are dependent on the political institutions in a country, the Kim

regime will not consider any fundamental reform of their economy. A possible

alternative to fundamental reform is Chinese style economic reforms. Under the

socialism with Chinese characteristics. China has melded their country into a mix of
inclusive and extractive economic and political institutions that, overtime, are gradually

becoming more inclusive.
The state of the DPRK's military policy is only a possible indicator of reform in
North Korea. If the DPRK attempted to entirely turn their economy from extractive to
inclusive institutions, their current military first policy would be unsustainable. As that

scenario has an extremely low likelihood under the current regime, the DPRK may

attempt to improve their economy in slight increments while improving their weapons
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program. Currently the DPRK spends approximately a quarter of their annual GDP on

military related items.170 Beside using nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip for
humanitarian aid and concessions from other countries, the DPRK is known to sell their

weapons technolog} and might their nuclear knowledge.

History of Reform Attempts, Obstacles to Reform, and China
The DPRK is known for its reclusive politics and threats to the world, not reform. In
truth. North Korea has attempted to reform their economy previously, but no attempt has
proven successful. The reforms efforts all focused simply on fixing a symptom of their

economic problems instead of addressing the underlying problem.
The 2001 currency reforms are one of the most recent attempts. Following the
breakdown of the Public Distribution System (PDS) during the major famine on the
1990s. small-scale markets sprang up across North Korea.*
171172
As the government desires
as close to complete control over its people as possible, such markets were not allowed.

While the actions in 2001 were a form of reform, they were used as a way to help bring
the country back under government control. Many of the reform-minded actions were
not referred to as reforms.

Instead, they were called “utilitarian socialism.”

172

In January 2001. Rodong Sinmun. the official North Korean newspaper, wrote
"‘Things are not what they used to be in the 1960s. So no one should follow the way
people used to do things in the past." Kim Jong-Il and the entire regime changed their

views on reform within a few years. By 2009. the Kim regime changed their tune. In
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March 2009. Kim Jong-11 said that the state should “energetically lead the masses by
displaying the same work style as officials did in the 1950s and 1960s.”173 Following

Kim Jong-Il's death, people within North Korea went further and now refer to these ideas
as "ideological pollution.174 Sometimes. Kim Jong-Il's reform attempts are referred to as

"utilitarian socialism”.175

China has attempted to improve the DPRK's economy, mainly through sharing
some of their successful business with the DPRK and trade. Chinese trade with the
DPRK has increased steadily, but the DPRK's economy has not followed suit. In

response. "Beijing has grown increasingly perplexed, frustrated, and probably very angry

over its increasingly obvious inability to persuade, cajole, or pressure its erstwhile North
Korea friend and ally to [reform its economy]”.*
176 Prior to Kim Jong-Il's death, Zhou
174

Yongkang. a "senior leader in the CCP”. told Kim Jong-Il that China would support Kim

Jong-Un as Kim Jong-Il's successor, but only if North Korea took ‘"substantive steps to

open up its economy, including rejoining diplomatic efforts, to relieve the external
economic pressures on it”.177
There is a slight possibility' that the DPRK may emulate China and reform their
economy. China radically transformed their country through implementing the Reform

and Opening lip policy of 1978. but a host of factors obstruct the DPRK from treading a

similar path. First, while China of 1978 and the DPRK of 2013 are similar, their
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governments are radically different. In the late 1970s. there was much controversy within
the leadership of the PRC and Deng Xiaoping eventually gained power. Following Kim

Jong-Il's sudden death in December 2011. his youngest son Kim Jong-Un seamlessly
transitioned into his role as supreme leader, at least as far as the outside world is
concerned. Deng Xiaoping was a ven charismatic leader who relentlessly pushed major
reform for China. ‘ ‘ Since then. Chinese leaders have espoused the idea that 'do get rich

is glorious".170 Under this policy. China transformed itself into the economic giant we
know and recognize today.

North Korea lacks a Deng Xiaoping-esque character to push reform which makes

an\' possibilily for fundamental reform highly unlikely. Kim Jong-Un may have been
educated in the West. Switzerland, but he has displayed no tendency toward real reform.

Given the unknown nature of North Korean politics it is impossible to rule out the
possibility that a reform minded character does exist within the upper echelons of DPRK

politics, but no signs of such a person have been outwardly apparent. Secondly, North
Korea has proven fearful of minor reform, much less any major form of reform. This is a

direct result of the Arab Spring that swept across the Middle East North Africa region
recently. Leadership in North Korea watched as dictators who had ruled for decades

were deposed by democratic forces that barreled through the region like a tornado. While
many of the countries that participated in the Arab Spring were ruled by dictators, none of

them enjoyed even a fraction of the power the Kim family holds over their subjects.
Many of the dictators in the Middle East were feared; Kim Il-Sung is worshiped
similarly to a god and many North Koreans are told that they are the chosen race. North
178
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Korean leaders fear that opening up their economy to the world, especially South Korea,

will result in the population learning of the differences between their standard of living
and the rest of the world, thus allowing discontent to permeate throughout its populace.
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